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THE NEEDLE IN THE HAYSTACK: TOWARDS A NEW
STATE POSTCONVICTION REMEDY
Henry B. Robertson*
INTRODUCTION
State postconviction remedies ("PCRs") are the counterparts to federal
habeas corpus statutes found in 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2254, and 2255.1 They
exist because of, and are modeled on or interpreted in light of, the federal
statutes that allow relief to those in custody in violation of the Constitution of
the United States. PCRs have come under increasing fire lately because of the
ease with which convicted defendants can allege violations of their constitu-
tional rights.
The central problem remains as it was identified by Justice Jackson: "It
must prejudice the occasional meritorious application to be buried in a flood of
worthless ones. He who must search a haystack for a needle is likely to end up
with the attitude that the needle is not worth the search." 2
Opponents of wide-ranging postconviction relief often take "actual inno-
cence" as their touchstone, following in the wake of Second Circuit Judge
Henry J. Friendly's 1970 article, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack
on Criminal Judgments.3 In practice, the federal courts' hands are tied be-
cause they deal with acts of Congress that are rarely amended. The United
States Supreme Court has instead placed ever more difficult procedural obsta-
cles in the path of habeas petitioners. Never mind the merits, the paramount
goal is "stemming the overwhelming tide of prisoner petitions."'
Proponents of broadly available remedies view the procedure as a sort of
civil rights act, a counterpart of 42 U.S.C. § 1983,6 only with a greater
goal-freedom. Justice Marshall drew the parallel: "[H]abeas corpus and civil
rights actions are of 'fundamental importance . . . in our constitutional
scheme' because they directly protect our most valued rights."'
Statistics do not tell the whole story. Both foes and friends of federal habeas
enlist numbers into their arguments, the former pointing to the thousands of
* The author was an attorney in the Missouri State Public Defender System, 1981-91. He is
now a sole practitioner in St. Louis.
1. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2254, 2255 (1988)
2. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 537 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
3. Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U.
CHI. L. REV. 142 (1970).
4. Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 286 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
6. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 827 (1977) (citations omitted).
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petitions filed annually by state prisoners,7 while the latter argue that the
numbers have levelled off in recent years, and in any event make up only a
small percentage of the federal court caseload and thus have minimal impact
on the states' administration of criminal justice.8 The low success rate for fed-
eral petitioners likewise provides fodder for both camps.' Depending on one's
viewpoint, either there exists a deluge of frivolous petitions or the system poses
no threat of a wholesale release of guilty defendants.
As a former public defender and current practitioner in the field, I can at-
test to the frustrations felt by criminal defense attorneys, not to mention
judges and prosecutors, who have dealt with Missouri PCRs. My bitterness is
impartial. I execrate the encouragement the present system gives even the
most obviously guilty defendant to cast himself as a victim, and I execrate the
eagerness of the courts to throw the baby out with the bathwater by using
procedural bars to dispose of these pesky motions regardless of merit. I cannot
speak for attorneys in other states where those involved with PCRs may have
more fortunate experiences, although the scope of this Article is not limited by
any means to Missouri PCRs.
Prisoners who file frivolous motions fall into roughly three categories. Some
have no idea what it is all about; they do it because it is there. Their motions
tend to consist of a regurgitation of issues reserved for an appeal, not a PCR.
The second category includes the nitpickers, some manipulative, but many
quite sincere, who, locked in their cells with a lot of time on their hands, be-
come morbidly sensitive to the slightest error, real or perceived, in the pro-
ceedings that led them to conviction. I have had a client repeatedly urge upon
me as a ground for relief his disagreement with the court reporter on the burn-
ing question of whether the voir dire at his trial was completed before or after
lunch. Finally, the third group is made up of those who become intoxicated by
their first visit to a law library and proceed to churn out reams of legal argu-
ment and glittering generalities about their constitutional rights without a fact
in sight.
The only consistency in the courts' treatment of PCRs is that they almost
always deny them out of hand. The proceedings are, and are intended to be,
exercises in futility. Some judges never grant evidentiary hearings, some rou-
tinely do, while others do so haphazardly. The more tolerant judges regard the
7. See Harris, 489 U.S. at 282 n.6 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (predicting further increases in
habeas petitions); Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 450 n.12 (1986) (detailing the steady in-
crease in habeas applications from 1963-66); Patrick E. Higginbotham, Reflections on Reform of
2254 Habeas Petitions, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1005, 1022 (1990).
8. Jack A. Guttenberg, Federal Habeas Corpus, Constitutional Rights, and Procedural For-
feitures: The Delicate Balance, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 617, 678-79 (1984); Larry W. Yackle, Ex-
plaining Habeas Corpus, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 991, 1010 n.74 (1985).
9. See Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1989) (Stevens, J. dissenting) (noting low
success rates in habeas petitions in noncapital cases); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 510 (1953)
(Frankfurter, J.) (stating that only five state prisoners were discharged by federal courts over a
four-year period prior to the case); Guttenberg, supra note 8, at 678 n.342, 693 n.419 (noting that
only four percent of all habeas petitions are successful); Higginbotham, supra note 7, at 1023.
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hearing as a gripe session. The defendant gets it off his chest by testifying to
complaints almost invariably framed as issues of ineffective assistance of coun-
sel. His trial attorney testifies to her trial strategy. The prisoner is returned to
the pen where, having learned the name of the game, he will blame his post-
conviction lawyer when he loses the PCR and his appellate lawyer when he
loses the appeal. I'm tired of taking the rap for adverse decisions. The courts
rule that way because they want to, not (usually) because of any incompetence
on my part.
Postconviction remedies should exist because sometimes people are wrongly
convicted, and an avenue of relief must be kept open.." But the current system
creates the mirage of a wide, open highway where, actually, there is only a
narrow track. In legal terms, I agree with Judge Friendly that the "constitu-
tional rights" formulation is no longer useful.11 It promises prisoners what it
does not deliver, and infuriates the courts to the point where they hold in
contempt the law they are sworn to enforce.
This Article is founded on the hope that some benefit is to be derived, at
least in terms of efficiency and consistency, from concentrating the minds of
all concerned on what is really at issue. Its goal is to replace the constitutional
rights regime with a rule that actually says what it means and means what it
says. Two big steps can be taken to make postconviction relief an extraordi-
nary remedy rather than a routine irritant.
First, a PCR should state on its face what case law usually says for it: that
issues available for direct appeal are barred.1" In other words, a PCR is a
remedy in the nature of coram nobis, which requires the defendant to allege
facts outside the trial record.13
Second, a PCR should incorporate the requisite standard of constitutional
prejudice, which is higher than most people realize.1 This may not deter in-
mates from filing frivolous motions, but it should guide the courts in win-
nowing them out and doing so on the merits, for with PCRs prejudice is the
merits.
10. Paul C. Weick, Apportionment of the Judicial Resources in Criminal Cases: Should
Habeas Corpus Be Eliminated?, 21 DEPAUL L. REV. 740, 748 (1972).
11. Friendly, supra note 3, at 155-57.
12. DONALD E. WILKES, JR., FEDERAL AND STATE POsTcONvICTION REMEDIES AND RELIEF
app. A (2d ed. 1987 and Supp. 1990) (Survey of the States).
13. LARRY W. YACKLE, POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES § 8, at 31-32 (1981); Documentary Sup-
plement, State Post-Conviction Remedies and Federal Habeas Corpus, 12 WM. & MARY L. REV.
149, 150-51 n.4 (1970). The writ of error coram nobis "is an ancient common law writ used for
the purpose of obtaining a review and correction of a judgment by the same court which rendered
it, with respect to some error of fact affecting the validity and regularity of the judgment." 49
C.J.S. Judgments § 311 (1984).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 140-49 (discussing the levels of prejudice used to evalu-
ate constitutional claims and noting that only "fundamental" errors merit issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus).
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I. WHY PCRs ExiST
Even the United States Supreme Court can sometimes mistake statutory
habeas corpus for the Great Writ. 15 They are distinct. The Writ, which may
not be suspended except as provided in Article I of the Federal Constitution,
was early identified with the common law writ of habeas corpus ad sub-
ficiendum, which looked only to the jurisdiction of the court and shut its eyes
to any defect in the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction. 6 Without
rehearsing the old debate,"7 it is now established that the statutory regime, at
least as extended to the states by 28 U.S.C. § 2254, is a discretionary grant of
jurisdiction by Congress under Article III of the Constitution. 8
At one point, the Supreme Court threatened to hold that due process re-
quired the states to provide postconviction remedies,' 9 but it has now held that
there is no such requirement.2"
There was no stampede to abolish PCRs, as some might have expected.
State court hostility to federal review is usually veiled by judicial decorum and
legalism, although an occasional outspoken judge may vent a desire "to ward
off the federal judiciary," 2' and express resentment of the Supreme Court's
,'view that state court judges could not be trusted to protect the rights given
the people of their states by the Constitution of the United States." 2 But the
states have been known to use "a procedural morass"2 or "labyrinth . . .
made up entirely of blind alleys, each of which is useful only as a means of
convincing the federal courts that the'state road which the petitioner has taken
was the wrong one";24 to create novel defaults that result in "procedural am-
15. See. e.g., Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 126 (1982) (reversing the lower court's issuance of
habeas corpus relief because respondents failed to make contemporaneous objections to allegedly
unconstitutional jury instructions).
16. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 474-75 (1976); Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193,
202 (1830); Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 93-95 (1807).
17. See, e.g., Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 379-81 (1977); id. at 384-86 (Burger, C.J.,
concurring); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 406 (1963); Robert N. Clinton, Rule 9 of the Federal
Habeas Corpus Rules: A Case Study on the Need for Reform of the Rules Enabling Acts, 63
IOWA L. REV. 15, 42-45 (1977); Note, Relieving the Habeas Corpus Burden: A Jurisdictional
Remedy, 63 IowA L. REV. 392, 421-24, 430-32 (1977).
18. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 77-78 (1977); id. at 105-06 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing); Stone, 428 U.S. at 474-76; id. at 511-12, 515 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Paul M. Bator,
Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441,
444-45 n.6 (1963); Yackle, supra note 8, at 1024-25.
19. See Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336, 337 (1965) (vacating a state court's denial of a
habeas petition and declining to assess the due process claim of a prisoner in a state formerly
without postconviction relief after the state legislature enacted a statute permitting such relief).
20. See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551' 557 (1987) (stating the "the Due Process Clause
does not require that the state supply a' lawyer" for defendants in collateral postconviction
proceedings).
21. State v. Handley, 585 S.W.2d 458, 467 (Mo. 1979) (Donnelly, C.J., concurring).
22. Flowers v. State, 618 S.W.2d 655, 658 (Mo. 1981) (en banc) (Donnelly, C.J., dissenting)
(citing Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312 (1963)).
23. Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561, 564 (1947) (Rutledge, J., concurring).
24. Id. at 567 (Rutledge, J., concurring).
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bush"; 5 or to raise nearly insurmountable procedural barriers that make the
remedy illusory.2 6 Ohio's Chief Justice in 1955 boasted of his state's record in
never allowing a prisoner's writ of habeas corpus..
Missouri Supreme Court Rules 24.035 and 29.15,28 which have aptly been
called "[possibly] the most cynical development in this field in a while,"2 9 have
proven to be veritable forfeiture factories. Failure to meet the absolute filing
deadlines of ninety days after delivery to prison, or thirty days after the filing
of the record if a direct appeal is taken, cannot be excused for any reason.80
Verification of both the original and amended motions by the movant himself
within the time limits is a jurisdictional requirement."1 Successive motions are
categorically barred. 2 One federal court expressed constitutional doubts about
this scheme, but comity made it timid.8 8 Although the express language of
Rules 24.035(a) and 29.15(a) states that they are the "exclusive procedure[s]"
for adjudicating the claims they allow after a plea of guilty or jury trial re-
spectively, the federal court stayed its hand in order to ascertain whether state
habeas corpus was still available as an alternate remedy.8' The Missouri Su-
preme Court cheerfully accepted the invitation to this dance and proceeded to
hint, without deciding, that state habeas relief might be available.8 5 To my
knowledge, there are no reported decisions on the resort to state habeas in this
posture because summary dismissal is the order of the day. Rules 24.035 and
29.15 are now in the fourth year of their reign.
In 1989, the Supreme Court of Arkansas abolished its PCR in a fit of pi-
25. Dion A. Sullivan, Habeas Corpus: Ending Endless Appeals and the Paradox of the Inde-
pendent and Adequate State Ground Doctrine, 11 WHITTIER L. REV. 783, 800-02 (1990) (quoting
Holloway v. Woodard, 655 F. Supp. 1245, 1250 (W.D.N.C. 1987)).
26. State v. Kapper, 448 N.E.2d 823 (Ohio), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 856 (1983); see Recent
Case, 13 CAP. U. L. REV. 329, 329-33 (1983) (discussing Kapper); see also Keener v. Ridenour,
594 F.2d 581, 589-91 (6th Cir. 1979) (criticizing the Ohio procedure and holding that the state
remedy is generally unavailable and need not be exhausted).
27. See Curtis R. Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Postconviction Remedy for State Prisoners,
108 U. PA. L. REV. 461, 472 (1960).
28. MO. SUP. CT. R. 24.035, 29.15.
29. Larry W. Yackle, The Misadventures of State Postconviction Remedies, 16 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & Soc. CHANGE 359, 381 n.128 (1987-88).
30. See State v. Wilson, 795 S.W.2d 590 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (trial court found as a fact that
the prison was at fault for failing to provide a notary); Woodrome v. State, 788 S.W.2d 544, 546
(Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (ignorance of the deadline was no excuse); O'Rourke v. State, 782 S.W.2d
808 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (timely delivery to prison mail room was insufficient).
31. See Malone v. State, 798 S.W.2d 149 (Mo. 1990) (en banc), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2044
(1991). In this case, counsel misguidedly signed the motion on her client's behalf while the client
was incarcerated in California. Id. at 150. Note that the supreme court disposed of the case on
procedural grounds even though the trial court had held a hearing on the merits. Id. at 151. Note
also that Malone was sentenced to death. Id. at 149.
32. Mo. SuP. CT. R. 24.035(k), 29.15(k).
33. See Richardson v. Miller, 716 F. Supp. 1246, 1247-51 (W.D. Mo. 1989).
34. Id.
35. See Kilgore v. State, 791 S.W.2d 393, 396 (Mo. 1990) (en banc).
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que.86 Eighteen months later, it reinstated the rule in modified form.87 Also in
1989, Michigan promulgated by court rule its first comprehensive postconvic-
tion remedy."8 All fifty states and the District of Columbia now have PCRs
despite the states' distaste for such remedies. 89 Why?
To put it cynically, state PCRs do not exist to provide a remedy but to
prevent one-the remedy of federal habeas. They aim to take advantage of the
presumption of correctness accorded to state court findings of fact under 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d),'40 limited and riddled with exceptions though it is, and any
procedural bars the federal courts will tolerate.
More and more states are incorporating procedural bars into their statutes
and rules,' 1 sometimes by reference to federal habeas waiver rules4 2 or the
"cause and prejudice" standard48 of Wainwright v. Sykes." As far back as
1967, the Georgia legislature prefaced its PCR statute with this manifesto:
(a) The General Assembly finds that:
(1) Expansion of the scope of habeas corpus in federal court by decisions
of the United States Supreme Court together with other decisions of the
court substantially curtailing the doctrine of waiver of constitutional rights
by an accused and limiting the requirement of exhaustion of state remedies
to those currently available have resulted in an increasingly large number of
convictions of the courts of this state being collaterally attacked by federal
habeas corpus based upon issues and contentions not previously presented to
or passed upon by courts of this state;
(2) The increased reliance upon federal courts tends to weaken state
courts as instruments for the vindication of constitutional rights with a re-
sultant deterioration of the federal system and federal-state relations; and
(3) To alleviate such problems, it is necessary that the scope of state
habeas corpus be expanded and the state doctrine of waiver of rights be
modified.
45
The pragmatic reformer will keep this attitude in mind: a state PCR is an
insurance policy against federal court intervention, and the state wants the
maximum possible coverage.
36. See Whitmore v. State, 771 S.W.2d 266, 269 (Ark. 1989).
37. In re Reinstatement of Rule 37, 797 S.W.2d 458 (Ark. 1990).
38. MICH. CT. R. subch. 6.500.
39. WILKES, supra note 12, app. A (Survey of the States).
40. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1988).
41. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1419 (1988); OR. REV. STAT. § 138.550 (1991); N.J. R. Gov-
ERNING CRIM. PRACTICE 3:22-4.
42. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2128 (West Supp. 1990); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §
9543(a)(3) (Supp. 1991).
43. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-39-21 (Supp. 1990); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 34.810.1, 177.375
(1989); DEL. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 61(i)(3); MICH. CT. R. subch. 6.508(D)(3).
44. 433 U.S. 72, 90-91 (1977).
45. GA. CODE ANN. § 9-14-40(a) (Michic 1990).
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II. THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
The federal statutory requirement that habeas petitioners be "in custody in
violation of the Constitution" could plausibly be read to mean that the prison-
ers must have suffered constitutional error so influential as to be the cause of
their custody."" This reading is rare, however. For the most part, interpretation
of the federal habeas statutes has not been shackled to the plain meaning rule.
The "custody in violation" language entered the statute book in 1867, but
for decades thereafter the Supreme Court continued to apply the traditional
concept of lack of jurisdiction as the sole ground for relief."7 When the term
"jurisdiction" had been stretched to its breaking point," the Court discarded
it in order to reach "exceptional cases where the conviction has been in disre-
gard of the constitutional rights of the accused, and where the writ is the only
effective means of preserving his rights."' 9 The reach of habeas corpus into the
realm of constitutional rights has since expanded and contracted. In Wain-
wright v. Sykes, Justice Rehnquist brazenly cited this interpretational history
in order to assert the Court's power "to overturn or modify its earlier views of
the scope of the writ, even where the statutory language authorizing judicial
action has remained unchanged."50
The scope of constitutional protections for the criminally accused has ex-
panded to such an extent that critics have come to believe it should no longer
be coextensive with federal habeas jurisdiction.51 Here is a description, from
the pen of Justice Cardozo, of how the Fourteenth Amendment applied to the
states in 1934:
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts is free to regulate the procedure of
its courts in accordance with its own conception of policy and fairness unless
in so doing it offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental. Its procedure does
not run foul of the Fourteenth Amendment because another method may
seem to our thinking to be fairer or wiser or to give a surer promise of
protection to the prisoner at the bar. Consistently with that amendment,
trial by jury may be abolished. Indictments by a grand jury may give way to
46. See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 383 (1986).
47. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 78-79 (1977) (commenting that the Court has
"grappled with the relationship" between the statutory writ and the common law writ for more
than a century); Stone v.- Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 475-76 (1976) (stating that, despite the existence
of statutory habeas, limits on jurisdiction have persisted).
The traditional concept of jurisdiction limited "federal habeas jurisdiction to consideration of
the jurisdiction of the sentencing court." Stone, 428 U.S. at 475.
48. Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 79 (tracing the expansion of habeas jurisdiction from 1856 to
1938); Bator, supra note 18, at 465-74, 494-95 (same).
49. Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 105 (1942) (citations omitted).
50. Wainaright, 433 U.S. at 81. This exercise was repeated in Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S.
478, 496 (1986) (defending the use of the cause and prejudice test despite its lack of "a perfect
historical pedigree").
51. Friendly, supra note 3, at 155-56; see Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 543 n.8 (1982) (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting).
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information by a public officer. The privilege against self-incrimination may
be withdrawn and the accused put upon the stand as a witness for the state.
What may not be taken away is notice of the charge and an adequate oppor-
tunity to be heard in defense of it."
It seems like another world.
The turning point for Justice Black was Mapp v. Ohio, 3 which bound the
states to observe the Fourth Amendment." Until Mapp, constitutional rights
"played a central role in assuring that the trial would be a reliable means of
testing guilt."5 The majority in Kaufman v. United States would not withhold
collateral review from Fourth Amendment or any other constitutional claims,
"whether or not they bear on the integrity of the fact-finding process.""5
But in Stone v. Powell,5 7 the Court withdrew habeas jurisdiction from
Fourth Amendment claims that the petitioner had an opportunity fully and
fairly to litigate in state court. 8 One theme in Stone was the idea that habeas
should only look into the defendant's innocence, or at least "the basic justice
of his incarceration."" But the Court also relied on the exclusionary rule's
lack of constitutional stature and its loss of deterrent effect in the setting of
collateral relief.60
That was as far as it went. The Court has refused to Stone claims of racial
discrimination in grand jury selection,6 and for the time being Stone remains
the only exception to the cognizability of all claims of constitutional error on
federal habeas.62
To obtain habeas corpus relief, however, it is not enough to allege and prove
a constitutional violation. Perhaps in earlier days it was assumed that any con-
stitutional error was by that nature so severe as to call for collateral relief.
More recently, the Supreme Court has said that the defendant must prove a
violation more serious than plain error on direct appeal."
In federal cases arising under 28 U.S.C. § 2255,64 the Court says that non-
52. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934) (citations omitted).
53. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
54. Id. at 655.
55. Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 237 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 229.
57. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
58. Apparently, the correctness of the state court's ruling is unreviewable. This curious qualifi-
cation is a nod in the direction of Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963) (holding that federal
courts reviewing habeas petitions can only scrutinize facts not properly resolved in the state pro-
ceeding). See Stone, 428 U.S. at 494 n.36 (withdrawing habeas jurisdiction on Fourth Amend-
ment claims, relying on Townsend); YACKLE, supra note 13, § 99, at 384 (discussing Stone and
Townsend).
59. Stone, 428 U.S. at 491 n.31.
60. Id. at 486, 489-94.
61. See Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 559-64 (1979).
62. McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 1462 (1991).
63. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134-35 (1982); Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154
(1977).
64. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1988).
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constitutional claims will be reached when they show "a fundamental defect
which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice."69 Stone v. Pow-
ell appears to extend this to section 2254 cases,66 although this would seem to
raise problems of federal jurisdiction in cases arising from the state courts.
This brings up the interesting question of whether errors of state law can
become constitutional issues. Supreme Court pronouncements on this subject
are not free from ambiguity. In Donnelly v. DeChristoforo,7 the Court con-
sidered but rejected a claim that a prosecutor's remark in closing argument
"so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a
denial of due process."68 Dugger v. Adams"9 says, "[I]t is clear that 'mere
errors of state law are not the concern of this Court unless they rise for some
other reason to the level of a denial of rights protected by the United States
Constitution.' '" In Lewis v. Jeffers,"' the Court held that "federal habeas
review of a state court's application of a constitutionally narrowed aggravating
circumstance is limited, at most, to determining whether the state court's find-
ing was so arbitrary or capricious as to constitute an independent due process
or Eighth Amendment violation."7
Other cases more guardedly seem to require violation of a specific constitu-
tional right." Yet even these cases leave open the possibility that "wrongs of
constitutional dimension," in the language of Smith v. Phillips," are discerned
by their prejudicial effect." Chandler v. Florida,76 cited in Smith, clearly
holds that media coverage of criminal trials may engender "prejudice of con-
stitutional dimensions" in one case but not in another.77
Misjoinder of offenses "would rise to the level of a constitutional violation
only if it results in prejudice so great as to deny a defendant his Fifth Amend-
ment right to a fair trial."' 79 In Loper v. Beto,9 a majority, including Justice
White in concurrence, concluded that impeachment of the defendant with an
uncounselled prior conviction would violate due process where its use "might
65. United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 783 (1979) (quoting Hill v. United States, 368
U.S. 424, 428 (1962)); Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346 (1974) (same).
66. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 477 n.10 (1976).
67. 416 U.S. 637 (1974).
68. Id. at 643.
69. 489 U.S. 401 (1989).
70. Id. at 409-10 (quoting Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 957-58 (1983)).
71. 110 S. Ct. 3092 (1990).
72. Id. at 3102.
73. See, e.g., Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41-42 (1984) (comparitive proportionality review);
Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 221 (1982) (prosecutorial misconduct); Cupp v. Naughten, 414
U.S. 141, 146 (1973) (jury instructions).
74. 455 U.S. 209 (1982).
75. Smith, 455 U.S. at 221.
76. 449 U.S. 560 (1981).
77. Id. at 582.
78. United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 446 n.8 (1986).
79. 405 U.S. 473 (1972).
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well have influenced the outcome of the case."80 When the prosecution fails to
disclose favorable evidence, "a constitutional error occurs, and the conviction
must be reversed, only if the evidence is material in the sense that its suppres-
sion undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial."81 The federal courts
of appeals regularly address contentions that trial errors of state law have
achieved constitutional magnitude.82
All constitutional rights are equal, but not every violation entitles a person
to relief. The doctrine of harmless constitutional error reinforces that notion. 8
"Properly understood, this argument is not about the nature of constitutional
rights but about the scope of federal habeas corpus."84
All this suggests that reference to the Constitution can be deleted from
PCRs altogether. The question is not the source of the right but the magnitude
of the prejudice.
III. INNOCENCE AND PROCESS
I never cease to be shocked by the well settled rule that a PCR cannot be
used to "relitigate" the issue of guilt, as by offering newly discovered evidence
of innocence.' The federal rule is the same: newly discovered evidence that
"merely" disputes the prisoner's guilt rather than the constitutionality of his
detention is not cognizable."a The reason is the courts' obsession with the final-
ity of jury verdicts.8 7
There is constitutional logic to this rule. Due process is concerned "with the
manner in which persons are deprived of their liberty."8 8 It is entirely possible
80. Id. at 480; id. at 485 (White, J., concurring).
81. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678 (1985). Most recently, in Estelle v. McGuire,
112 S. Ct. 475 (1991), the Supreme Court held that no federal due process violation occurred
where the trial court admitted relevant prior injury evidence pursuant to a California law. Id. at
481. The Court declined to address a circumstance where the admitted evidence was not relevant.
Id. The Estelle Court also held that certain jury instructions that deviated from the standard
California Jury Instructions did not violate any federal constitutional rights. Id. at 482-84.
82. See, e.g., Martin v. Kaiser, 907 F.2d 931, 934-35 (10th Cir. 1990) (admission of enhanced
tape recording); Deutscher v. Whitley, 884 F.2d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 1989) (misstatement of law
in closing argument), vacated, I l I S. Ct. 1678 (1991); Turner v. Armontrout, 845 F.2d 165, 169
(8th Cir. 1988) (exclusion of codefendant's statement against penal interest), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 928 (1988); Prather v. Rees, 822 F.2d 1418, 1423 (6th Cir. 1987) (instruction on lesser
included offense); Panzavecchia v. Wainwright, 658 F.2d 337, 340-42 (5th Cir. 1981) (denial of
severance of counts and admission of prior conviction).
83. See John C. Jeffries, Jr. & William J. Stuntz, Ineffective Assistance and Procedural De-
fault in Federal Habeas Corpus, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 679, 705-06 (1990).
84. Id. at 707.
85. Fields v. State, 572 S.W.2d 477, 480 (Mo. 1978) (en banc); Drake v. State, 582 S.W.2d
711, 714 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); WILKES, supra note 12, § 1-13, at 11.
86. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 317 (1963).
87. Keith A. Mitchell, Note, Protecting Guiltless Guilty: Material Witness Recantation and
Modern Post-Conviction Remedies, 21 NEw ENG. L. REv. 429, 437-38 (1986); Janice J. Repka,
Comment, Rethinking the Standards for New Trial Motions Based upon Recantations as Newly
Discovered Evidence, 134 U. PA. L. Rev. 1433, 1443-44 (1986).
88. Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 511 (1984).
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for an innocent person to be convicted at a trial that perfectly secures every
constitutional right. Innocence is irrelevant, 89 process is all; if "the whole pro-
ceeding is a mask," 90 a habeas court will step in. But human fallibility cannot
guarantee the innocent a remedy.
It is quite another thing to deny them relief. Professor Bator91 and Judge
Friendly" placed greater emphasis on innocence, more for its own sake than
as a constitutional value. Various Supreme Court justices have made "colora-
ble claims of innocence" their criterion for habeas relief,9" while the Court as
a whole has tried to isolate issues that bear directly on the accuracy of the
determination of guilt or innocence.9' In Jackson v. Virginia,"6 the Court ex-
tended federal review to claims of insufficient evidence under "the most ele-
mental of due process rights: freedom from a wholly arbitrary deprivation of
liberty.""6
The Court has said that the "ultimate objective" of our adversary system is
"that the guilty be convicted and the innocent go free."'97 No doubt there is
much truth in this, although it must not lead to the dangerous conclusion that
the guilty have no rights.
Pennsylvania's new PCR contains a clause allowing constitutional claims
"which, in the circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth-
determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could
have taken place."98 Just about any constitutional claim, however, except one
that seeks the exclusion of relevant evidence of guilt has a possible relation to
the determination of guilt or innocence and, as noted above, nearly every con-
stitutional issue is still cognizable on federal habeas. Recognizing this, Penn-
sylvania added a clause to cover violations that "would require the granting of
Federal habeas corpus relief to a state prisoner."991
At least for the time being, the Supreme Court has relegated "actual inno-
cence" to certain areas of the law where it serves as a test for exceptional
claims that would not otherwise be heard: those that may have retroactive
89. See Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 87-88 (1923).
90. Id. at 91.
91. See Bator, supra note 18, at 509.
92. See Friendly, supra note 3, at 150.
93. See, e.g., Spalding v. Aiken, 460 U.S. 1093 (1983) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (arguing to
limit habeas relief to instances of "colorable claims of innocence," "significant miscarriage[s] of
justice," or newly discovered evidence); Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 586-87 (1979) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (asserting that curing discrimination in selection of grand jury will not "protect inno-
cent defendants from unjust convictions"); Yackle, supra note 8, at 994 n.14 (quoting remarks of
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell).
94. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 312-13 (1989); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478
(1986).
95. 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
96. Id. at 314.
97. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 394 (1985) (quoting Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853,
862 (1975)).
98. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9543(a)(2)(i) (Supp. 1991).
99. Id. § 9543(a)(2)(v).
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effect 0' or leap all procedural hurdles 01 or justify a successive petition.102
IV. CUTTING THE GORDIAN KNOT OF PROCEDURAL BARS
It may be fun to explore the labyrinth of procedural defaults, trailing a ball
of thread for dear life, but I restrain myself. It is enough to encounter the
beast and try to drive a stake through its heart.
The federal courts have the power to ignore defaults.108 In Justice Holmes'
words, "[H]abeas corpus cuts through all forms and goes to the very tissue of
the structure. It comes in from the outside, not in subordination to the pro-
ceedings, and although every form may have been preserved, opens the inquiry
whether they have been more than an empty shell."' "
The doctrine of exhaustion of state remedies is now entrenched in 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254,105 despite the anomaly "which prompts th[e] Court to grant a second
review where the state has granted one but to deny any review at all where the
state has granted none."106 The old rule of Waley v. Johnston"7 that the
habeas writ will issue when it is the only effective remedy 08 is now the excep-
tion.109 The assumed purpose of the writ is "to redetermine the merits of fed-
eral constitutional questions decided in state criminal proceedings."110 Absent
a state decision, the doctrine "prescribe[s] a system of forfeitures in the last
area where such a system should prevail." 1 It would be foolish to seriously
believe that comity is promoted by having the federal judiciary review state
court decisions like professors grading exams in Con Law lO1.112
The most compelling criticism of forfeitures is that they foreclose meritori-
ous claims.11 By defaulting on the claim, usually through the agency of coun-
100. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 312-13 (1989).
101. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96 (1986).
102. McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 1467-72 (1991) (discussing successive petitions and
abuse of the writ).
103. See Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 135-36 (1987) (holding that states do not automat-
ically waive the nonexhaustion defense when failing to assert the argument in a lower court pro-
ceeding); Murray, 477 U.S. at 510-14 (Stevens, J., concurring) (reviewing various cases where the
Court has ignored procedural defaults).
104. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 346 (1915) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
105. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c) (1988).
106. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 552 (1953) (Black, J., dissenting).
107. 316 U.S. 101 (1942).
108. Id. at 104-05.
109. Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 581 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring) (criticizing the cur-
rent system of "nearly automatic federal habeas corpus review").
110. Bator, supra note 18, at 500.
111. Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, 190 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
112. See Bator, supra note 18, at 522-23 (contending that state judges and legislators will
resent being "second-guessed" by federal courts).
113. See Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 412-14 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Murray v.
Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 505 n.12 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring); John F. Decker, "Last Chance"
State Judicial Review in Criminal Cases-Illinois' Collateral Attack Remedies: A Call for a
Principled Jurisprudence, 38 DEPAUL L. REv. 201, 284-85 (1989); Graham Hughes, Sandbag-
ging Constitutional Rights: Federal Habeas Corpus and the Procedural Default Principle, 16
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sel, the defendant effectively forfeits his constitutional rights. 1' This is espe-
cially true of the rigid "cause and prejudice" standard of Wainwright v.
Sykes:115 even if the defendant shows the requisite prejudice to excuse his de-
fault, he may still be barred for failing to establish the conjunctive element of
cause. 11 Some would therefore eliminate the cause requirement.'1 7
Since a lawyer will usually be responsible for a default, an ineffective assis-
tance of counsel argument is one way to show cause.118 This approach usually
fails, binding the defendant to decisions in which he took no part, and further
poisoning attorney-client relations."" If one goal of finality is to reconcile the
defendant to his condition, to get him to look forward instead of backward,
then as Judge Lay of the Eighth Circuit said, "[I]t is difficult to perceive that
a prisoner who is procedurally barred from raising a constitutional right will
consequently acknowledge that he is justly subject to sanction. 1 120 The inmate
will nurse his grudge and continue to blame his successive lawyers for his
predicament.
From a practical standpoint, perhaps the best argument to make against
procedural bars is that they are a monumental waste of time and effort.1 1
Forests have been devastated and lakes of ink drained in discussing these ar-
cane concepts. Remands can turn a case into "a game of judicial ping-pong
between the state and federal courts,1 1 1 further extending a process the Court
itself decries as unconscionably lengthy.1 2 8 For example, Charles Townsend's
case dragged on for more than twenty years.1 2' Henry Hawk died in the sec-
ond decade of his postconviction litigation.1 2 5
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 321, 333-34 (1987-88).
114. See Guttenberg, supra note 8, at 673-74; Reitz, supra note 27, at 489-90.
115. 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1986).
116. See Murray, 477 U.S. at 492-95.
117. See id.; id. at 501-05 (Stevens, J., concurring); Guttenberg, supra note 8, at 702.
118. Murray, 477 U.S. at 488-89.
119. Guttenberg, supra note 8, at 707-08.
120. Donald P. Lay, Modern Administrative Proposals for Federal Habeas Corpus: The
Rights of Prisoners Preserved 21 DEPAUL L. REV. 701, 711 (1972).
121. See Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 600 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Frank J. Rem-
ington, Restricting Access to Federal Habeas Corpus: Justice Sacrificed on the Altars of Expedi-
ency, Federalism, and Deterrence, 16 NY.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 339, 356-57 (1987-88);
Sullivan, supra note 25, at 796-97.
122. Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 270 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
123. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Zant, 1 I1 S. Ct. 1454, 1468-89 (1991) (addressing standards of
abuse-of-writ arguments for second or subsequent habeas petitions); Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S.
129, 132-33 (1987) (discussing state failure to raise nonexhaustion defense until the appellate
level).
124. United States ex rel. Townsend v. Twomey, 322 F. Supp. 158, 160-61 (N.D. Ill.), revd,
452 F.2d 350 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 854 (1972); United States ex rel. Townsend
v. Twomey, 493 F.2d 1325 (7th Cir. 1974). This last decision involved the defendant's allegation
that the state had failed to comply with the Seventh Circuit's mandate. Both the district court and
the court of appeals remanded for (what else?) exhaustion of state remedies.
125. Reitz, supra note 27, at 466 n.30.
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The Supreme Court justifies forfeitures on grounds of finality and comity,"'
neither of which has any place in habeas corpus.127 If verdicts were taken as
absolutely final, then our law would be a "pretender to absolute truth."128
Postconviction relief assumes by its very existence that finality and comity will
be set aside in the appropriate case. The goal is to identify that case, not to
balance interests for the sake of achieving some politically expedient consen-
sus. Taken to their logical conclusion, finality and comity would preclude post-
conviction relief altogether. 1
2
'
The Supreme Court's emphasis on these two principles has given the states
carte blanche to enact their own systems of forfeitures. More and more states
incorporate them explicitly into their PCR provisions.180 Some courts prefer to
invoke procedural defaults even where a lower court has addressed the mer-
its."' In Missouri, when a judge has had the temerity to reach the merits of
an untimely PCR, appellate courts have been known to adopt the bizarre expe-
dient of teaching the judge a lesson by reversing a decision against the defend-
ant with orders to dismiss the motion instead. 2
Try as they do, some courts cannot seem to help but double their pleasure
by discussing both the procedural bar and the merits.18 And the fact remains
that any time a court addresses the prejudice prong of cause and prejudice, it
addresses the merits. The Gramley case may be read as an example of the
absurd but inevitable consequence of the holding in Murray v. Carrier8 that
in order to use ineffective assistance as cause to excuse a default, the issue
must first "be presented to the state courts as an independent claim."185 The
issue is at once substantive and procedural. The two aspects are confounded
since prejudice is an element of ineffective assistance, 88 although according to
Murray the ineffectiveness claim goes only to the cause prong of Wainwright
126. See McCleskey, 11l S. Ct. at 1469-70; Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 308 (1989); Mur-
ray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495 (1986); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982).
127. See Butler v. McKellar, 110 S. Ct. 1212, 1226 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Reed v.
Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 15 (1983); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 322-23 (1979); Sanders v. United
States, 373 U.S. 1, 8 (1963).
128. Burr v. Florida, 474 U.S. 879, 880 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
129. Guttenberg, supra note 8, at 642.
130. 1 will not attempt to list them all but instead refer the reader to the statutes and rules
cited in WILKES, supra note 12, app. A (Survey of the States). See supra notes 41-43 for citations
to applicables statutes and rules.
131. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Simmons v. Gramley, 915 F.2d 1128, 1132 (7th Cir. 1990)
(discussing petitioner's failure to appeal in state court before addressing the merits); Hughes v.
Idaho State Bd. of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding lack of "cause and
prejudice" to petitioner's default, and thus not reaching merits, although lower court did address
merits).
132. See, e.g., Staggs v. State, 785 S.W.2d 567 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (motion filed one day
late).
133. See, e.g., Fairchild v. Lockhart, 900 F.2d 1292, 1295 (8th Cir. 1990) (addressing default
and merits); Gramley, 915 F.2d at 1132-36, 1140 (same).
134. 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
135. Id. at 488-89.
136. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691-96 (1984).
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v. Sykes. "
Justices White and Stevens hit the nail on the head when they pointed out
that in determining the issue of prejudice the Court necessarily reaches the
merits of a case.188 Why not skip the procedural detours and get right to the
heart of the matter?
V. LEVELS OF PREJUDICE
In his Rose v. Lundy dissent, one of the most sensible opinions on the sub-
ject, Justice Stevens listed four categories of constitutional claims, the first
being that which discloses no error and the rest ascending by levels of
prejudice. 13 9
The first level consists of errors that do not warrant reversal on direct ap-
peal. Most constitutional errors can be harmless. 1 0 The second category in-
cludes reversible errors that "do not reveal the kind of fundamental unfairness
to the accused that will support a collateral attack on a final judgment." '
The third category, plain errors requiring reversal on direct appeal, is a sub-
set of the previous category. The Supreme Court has held that plain error,
without more, is not sufficient grounds for collateral relief."" The fourth cate-
gory contains the only errors that merit issuance of the writ, "those errors that
are so fundamental that they infect the validity of the underlying judgment
itself, or the integrity of the process by which that judgment was obtained. '14 8
Federal habeas is concerned with fundamental fairness, that is, with the Four-
teenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.1 4 4 Due process "has never been, and
perhaps can never be," more "precisely defined" than as fundamental
fairness. 4 8
This is not all, as it turns out. The cause and prejudice test creates two
additional levels of prejudice. The fifth is that which would excuse a proce-
dural default but will not get the petitioner past the courthouse door if he fails
to show cause as well. His burden is to prove "not merely that the errors at his
137. There is confusion over whether Strickland prejudice and Sykes prejudice are the same or
different. Compare Rodriguez v. Young, 906 F.2d 1153, 1159 n.2 (7th Cir. 1990) (prejudice defi-
nition flexible), cert. denied, I11 S. Ct. 698 (1991) with Deutscher v. Whitley, 884 F.2d 1152,
1156 (9th Cir. 1989) (Strickland prejudice is sufficient), vacated, 111 S. Ct. 1678 (1991) and
Maupin v. Smith, 785 F.2d 135, 139 (6th Cir. 1986) ("actual" prejudice is necessary).
138. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97-98 (1977) (White, J., concurring); Murray, 477
U.S. at 505 (Stevens, J., concurring).
139. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 543-44 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
140. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1263 (1991) (coerced confessions can be
harmless error); Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786 (1979) (failure to instruct jury on presump-
tion of innocence); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (prosecution's comments to jury
on defendant's failure to testify)
141. Rose, 455 U.S. at 543 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
142. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134-35 (1982); Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154
(1977).
143. Rose, 455 U.S. at 544 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
144. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697 (1984).
145. Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981).
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trial created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and
substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional
dimension. '"16
The sixth level is such prejudice that overcomes every default regardless of
cause, "where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction
of one who is actually innocent."" 7 This situation involves a "fundamental
miscarriage of justice,""' which is not shown where "the alleged constitu-
tional error neither precluded the development of true facts nor resulted in the
admission of false ones." 1 9
Terminology is a problem here. Plain error is customarily defined as a mis-
carriage of justice.160 While the courts insist that there is a difference between
reversible error and plain error, I have never seen it satisfactorily explained.
Even reversible error must have had some potential impact on the verdict;
harmless error does not warrant reversal. Perhaps the main difference lies in
the assumption that lawyers who preserve an error for review may be re-
warded with a reversal that they would not otherwise get, or in the plausibility
of strategically not objecting when they should have.
Plain error by definition means that reversal is required although the error
was not preserved in the trial court.151 This makes it hard to distinguish higher
levels of prejudice based on their ability to overcome procedural defaults. Even
plain error assumes a default.
The two highest levels of prejudice emphasize "actual prejudice" and "ac-
tual innocence." This must mean that a court will eschew the usual effort to
assess the probable effect of error on the trier of fact 2 and any presumptions
of prejudice, 53 and look for a direct impact on the outcome. This is unlike the
approach of an appellate court, which may reverse for reasons such as evi-
dence of other crimes154 or inflammatory argument' " that prejudice the jury
against the defendant although, or even because, it is not relevant to the
charge for which he is on trial.
It is fruitless, not to say illusory, to try to distinguish between different de-
grees of miscarriage of justice. The problem for purposes of this Article is to
146. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982) (emphasis in original); see Murray v.
Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 494 (1986).
147. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 537 (1986); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. at 496.
148. McCleskey v. Zant, 11I S. Ct. 1454, 1470-71 (1991); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. at 495.
149. Smith, 477 U.S. at 538.
150. See United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985); United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152,
163 (1982); id. at 179 (Brennan, J., dissenting); 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1684 (1989).
151. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b) ("Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may
be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court.").
152. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967) (assessing error's contribution to con-
viction); ROGER J. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR 22-23 (1970) (advocating inspec-
tion of error's effect on judgment rather than "merely looking at result").
153. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) (assessing presumption of
prejudice from ineffective assistance of counsel claims).
154. See, e.g., State v. Cook, 673 S.W.2d 469, 472 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
155. See. e.g., State v. Tiedt, 206 S.W.2d 524, 526-28 (Mo. 1947).
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distinguish between plain error and fundamental (constitutional) unfairness. It
seems that "fundamentally unfair" is the only available phrase. It is vague but
carries the flavor of Fourteenth Amendment prejudice, and it is more amena-
ble to some cognizable claims (such as discrimination in grand or petit jury
selection) than outcome-determinative harmless error analysis. 15 6
Sometimes the Supreme Court uses the harmless constitutional error rule of
Chapman v. California.57 This confuses the issue still further because it is not
even a test for plain error, let alone habeas error, but only for reversible or
harmless error, unless it is assumed that constitutional error is by nature
greater in magnitude than other kinds of error. Chapman can be read to inti-
mate this, but does not cite any constitutional underpinning for its standard of
"harmless beyond a reasonable doubt," 58 relying instead on the Court's power
to decide federal questions and its responsibility to protect constitutional rights
in the absence of congressional action. 15
Chapman places the burden on the beneficiary of error to prove harmless-
ness.16 The lower federal courts generally, but not uniformly, shift the burden
to the state once the defendant has made out a prima facie case.16 ' The Su-
preme Court seems not to have decided whether the harmless error doctrine
should apply differently on a collateral attack than on a direct appeal. 1' 2 Jus-
tice Stevens broached the question in Greer v. Miller,63 but the majority did
not reach it. 64 Strickland v. Washington says that no special standards will
apply to ineffectiveness claims on habeas, 65 but this is hardly a signal of uni-
formity. Prejudice is an element of ineffective assistance, so the burden of
proof is clearly on the defendant. 66 On the other hand, prejudice is not an
element of a claim that the defendant was denied his right to consult with
156. See Hollis v. Davis, 912 F.2d 1343, 1350-54 (1lth Cir. 1990).
157. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23-24 (1967); see also Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S.
254, 263-64 (1986) (plurality) (grand jury discrimination can never be harmless); McKaskle v.
Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n.8 (1984) (denial of right to self-representation cannot be harmless);
Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 117-21 (1983) (denial of defendant's right to be present may be
harmless); Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 232 (1977) (lack of counsel at pretrial identification
may be harmless); YACKLE, supra note 13, § 94, at 365 (surveying harmless error law).
158. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24.
159. Id. at 21.
160. See id. at 24, 26.
161. See YACKLE, supra note 13, § 133, at 503. But see Payne v. Smith, 667 F.2d 541, 545
(6th Cir. 1981) (holding that defendant failed to satisfy burden of showing prejudice when argu-
ing that jury saw him in handcuffs during trial), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 932 (1982).
162. Michael T. Fisher, Note, Harmless Error, Prosecutorial Misconduct, and Due Process:
There's More to Due Process than the Bottom Line, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1298, 1309 n.63 (1988).
Judge Friendly thinks it should. See Friendly, supra note 3, at 157 n.81. It may simply be that the
Supreme Court takes up cases to decide constitutional questions without regard to their proce-
dural posture. See Vivian 0. Berger, The Supreme Court and Defense Counsel. Old Roads, New
Paths-A Dead End?, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 9, 99 (1986).
163. 483 U.S. 756, 767-69 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring).
164. Id. at 765 n.6.
165. 466 U.S. 668, 697-98 (1984).
166. See id. at 694, 696.
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counsel during trial. 1 7 The burden could therefore be shifted or not, depend-
ing on the claim.
The Sixth Circuit recognizes two harmless error tests on habeas petitions. 68
If constitutional error is clear, use the Chapman test.1 9 If the issue is whether
error of a less specific kind rose to the level of a due process violation, apply a
"totality of the circumstances" test derived from Kentucky v. Whorton.170
Since the Supreme Court applies the Chapman test, albeit without recon-
ciling it with the fundamental fairness inquiry on habeas corpus,'" the Court's
recent decision in Arizona v. Fulminante172 could be important. Fulminante
distinguishes "trial errors" from "structural defects." Trial errors are those
arising during presentation of the case to the jury and are susceptible of harm-
less error analysis.17 1 "Structural defects," in light of which " 'a criminal trial
cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or
innocence'" (such as denial of counsel altogether, biased judge, grand jury
discrimination, denial of a public trial or of the right to self-representation),
however, can never be harmless.1 7' Structural defects could be those constitu-
tional violations that entitle defendants to postconviction relief without further
inquiry into prejudice or fundamental unfairness.
There is one more pertinent test for prejudice. In Strickland v. Washington,
the Court set standards for claims of "actual" ineffective assistance of counsel,
drawing them from cases in which the defense had been denied access to evi-
dence.1 75 "The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would
have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to un-
dermine confidence in the outcome.' 76 Strickland is a Sixth Amendment
case, but it is also a habeas case. The court may have been fudging, but in
Part IV of its opinion it clearly equated the ineffective assistance test with
167. Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 278-79 (1989).
168. See Payne v. Smith, 667 F.2d 541, 544 n.2 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 932
(1982).
169. Id.
170. Id. (citing Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786 (1979)).
In Whorton, the Supreme Court applied the "totality of circumstances" test in the context of a
lower court's failure to instruct the jury on the presumption of the defendant's innocence, stating
that the failure to give the instruction, by itself, was not unconstitutional, but the failure to in-
struct, in combination with other faulty jury instructions, certain arguments by counsel, and the
weight of the evidence, reached the level of unconstitutionality. Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S.
786, 789 (1979).
171. See, e.g., Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570 (1986); Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371
(1972).
172. 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991).
173. Id. at 1264.
174. Id. at 1264-65 (quoting Rose, 478 U.S. at 577-78). I agree with Justice White that this
facile distinction is mistaken, see id. at 1253-55, but it is the law now. Violations of the right to
counsel may or may not be presumptively prejudicial. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381
n.6 (1986). It is hard to divide these into trial and nontrial errors.
175. 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).
176. Id.
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fundamental unfairness. 177
The next year, in United States v. Bagley,17 8 the Court adopted Strickland
as the test for materiality of favorable evidence the prosecution failed to dis-
close to the defense. 179 The test applies whether the defense makes no request,
a general request, or a specific request for the information, because due pro-
cess is concerned with the effect of nondisclosure on the trial, not the culpabil-
ity of the prosecutor. 8 ' Bagley viewed Strickland as an illustration of "when
evidence is not introduced because of the incompetence of counsel."''
The Strickland prejudice prong therefore recommends itself as 'a standard
for the constitutional materiality of evidence not presented at trial. That is the
inquiry on a PCR.
At the risk of misreading the Court, the Strickland test may be used to
judge the prejudicial effect of constitutional errors, except as to "structural
defects" that are presumptively prejudicial under Fulminante. Alternatively,
fundamental unfairness may do double duty as the test for both classes of
error.
VI. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
If you wish to survey the fastest growing areas of law, I confidently suggest
that you open any West's Digest to the key number Criminal Law 641.13-in-
effective assistance of counsel.
The right to effective assistance was one of the first rights incorporated
through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause so as to apply to
the states, in the famous case of the Scottsboro boys. 8 ' In the more legislative
mode of constitutional adjudication now prevalent, it acquired a "two-pronged
test" in Strickland v. Washington: "[T]he defendant must show that counsel's
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness"183 and that
he suffered prejudice as defined above.8' Already in 1953 Justice Frankfurter
noted a heavy preponderance of ineffective assistance claims. 85 He hadn't
seen anything yet.
Strickland catalogued, while piously wishing away, some of the ills it would
177. Id. at 696-98 ("[T]he ultimate focus of inquiry must be on the fundamental fairness of the
proceeding whose result is being challenged.").
178. 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
179. Id. at 681-82.
180. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219-20 (1982).
181. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682.
182. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) ("[T]he necessity of counsel was so vital
and imperative that the failure of the trial court to make an effective appointment of counsel was
likewise a denial of due process within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
183. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).
184. Id. at 692. "The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would be different. A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. at 694.
185. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 520 (1953) (app. to concurring opinion of Frankfurter,
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bring in its train:
Criminal trials resolved unfavorably to the defendant would increasingly
come to be followed by a second trial, this one of counsel's unsuccessful
defense. Counsel's performance and even willingness to serve could be ad-
versely affected. Intensive scrutiny of counsel and rigid requirements for ac-
ceptable assistance could dampen the ardor and impair the independence of
defense counsel, discourage the acceptance of assigned cases, and undermine
the trust between attorney and client. 186
Another problem with the ineffective counsel argument is that it tends to focus
on what a savvy lawyer would do (on the adversarial process), rather than on
an impartially fair result. It may be bad practice, and even un-American, for
counsel to share information with the police,1 87 for instance, but, arguably, it
could more fully develop the truth.
Much of the blame for the proliferation of ineffective assistance claims must
be laid at the door of the courts.' 88 In my state, Missouri, nearly every consti-
tutional claim can be dismissed as "mere trial error" not cognizable on a
PCR, even if it is a classic example of a valid issue. 8 9 "Ineffective assistance"
is the shibboleth, the password, to postconviction litigation that everybody rec-
ognizes. There is no way around it.
For present purposes, there are two main objections to ineffective assistance
as a postconviction theory. First, it functions as a sort of incorporation clause.
Errors of state law that would otherwise not be cognizable become "federal-
ized," transformed into Sixth Amendment issues. 9 In Kimmelman v. Morri-
son,'"' the Supreme Court, having barred the front door to Fourth Amend-
ment claims in Stone v. Powell, flung open the back door by permitting
charges of incompetence in litigating search and seizure issues? 91
186. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.
187. See In re Hall, 637 P.2d 690, 699 (Cal. 1981) (criticizing defendant's attorney for giving
the police an unsolicited list of potential defense witnesses and other information to further the
police investigation of a crime allegedly committed by the defendant).
188. See Johnson v. Kemp, 585 F. Supp. 1496, 1499 n.l (S.D. Ga. 1984) (arguing that Su-
preme Court decisions that intended to limit habeas petitions questioning the validity of state
procedures have led to petitioners refraining their appeals as ineffective assistance of counsel
claims), affd in part, vacated in part, 759 F.2d 1503 (1 1th Cir. 1985).
189. Compare Lewis v. State, 501 S.W.2d 20, 23-24 (Mo. 1973) (coerced confession) with Fay
v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 399-415 (1963) (granting habeas relief in a coerced confession case));
compare State v. White, 790 S.W.2d 467, 474-75 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (state used false testimony
and failed to disclose evidence) with Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935) (same); compare
Hill v. State 641 S.W.2d 194 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (excessive security) with Holbrook v. Flynn,
475 U.S. 560 (1985) (same).
190. See, e.g.. Williamson v. State, 771 S.W.2d 601, 607-08 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989) (holding
counsel incompetent for failing to object to closing argument that bolstered the credibility of po-
lice witnesses, which would have been reversible error if preserved).
191. 477 U.S. 365 (1986).
192. See id. at 382-83; see also Jeffries & Stuntz, supra note 83, at 687-88 (detailing how
attorney errors in litigating Fourth Amendment violations permitted defendants to assert Sixth
Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel claims).
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Second, the conjunctive test of Strickland, like the cause and prejudice test
of Wainwright v. Sykes, allows a defendant who has been constitutionally
prejudiced to be impaled on the other prong. Strickland is "highly deferen-
tial" to counsel, 193 and a court may rule against the defendant by finding that
counsel's investigation, though limited, was reasonable,e'" or that counsel pur-
sued an alternative strategy that was objectively reasonable.'95 If counsel has
failed to present an adequate defense, then the courts should focus on the via-
bility of that defense, not on the performance of counsel.
Strickland deals with "actual ineffectiveness claims alleging a deficiency in
attorney performance," as distinct from the absolute or constructive denial of
counsel altogether, as by a conflict of interest. 96 The emphasis on ineffective
assistance, both as a substantive claim and as an excuse for procedural de-
faults, sends the wrong message to defendants. It incongruously mingles the
performance of defense lawyers, who usually see their goal as doing the utmost
for their clients, with a less partisan notion of the correct result at trial.' 97
Claims of "actual" ineffectiveness should be banished to the nether regions
whence they came.
VII. THE PRIMACY OF DIRECT APPEAL
Most states do not let a defendant bring a claim that was, or could have
been, decided on direct appeal. This is an accepted procedural bar in federal
court, subject always to the cause and prejudice test.'" Direct appeal is "the
primary avenue for review,"199 and collateral attack must not "do service for
an appeal."200
Appellate courts have the tools to deal with any errors or defects apparent
on record, including plain errors. If a state court reaches the merits under its
plain error rule, the defendant has a ruling to take into federal court. 0 1 Hav-
ing exhausted the direct appeal, there is no need to pursue the same issues on
a PCR.20 This means that the trial record is off limits as a source of issues.
Some state PCRs expressly preclude direct appeal claims under the heading of
procedural bars.208 I aim to put it directly into the statement of cognizable
193. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984).
194. Id. at 690-91.
195. Id. at 672-73, 699.
196. Id. at 692-93.
197. Berger, supra note 162, at 94-96.
198. See Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 408-09 (1989) (holding that respondent failed to
show cause and prejudice when failing to object to judge's objectionable remarks to prospective
jurors).
199. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983).
200. United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 784 (1979) (quoting Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S.
174, 178 (1947)).
201. Cf. Hearn v. Mintzes, 708 F.2d 1072, 1075-76 (6th Cir. 1983) (challenging improper
remarks by prosecutor to jury).
202. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 125 n.28 (1982).
203. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 19-4901(b) (Supp. 1991); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2128
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grounds, to give defendants better notice of what a PCR is all about.20 4
The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act lists among its grounds that
"evidence, not previously presented and heard, exists requiring vacation of the
conviction or sentence in the interest of justice." 06 This is simpler and better
than the traditional "newly discovered evidence" standards that, like the writ
of error coram nobis2 °6 impose the additional obstacle of justifying the failure
to discover evidence by showing lack of knowledge and due diligence.107
A fuller, more workable definition comes from a California case, In re
Branch.2"' The California Supreme Court was willing to grant habeas corpus
relief for "new evidence" of actual innocence because "it is so fundamentally
unfair for an innocent person to be incarcerated that he should not be denied
relief simply because of his failure at trial to present exculpatory evidence." 209
The court therefore distinguished new evidence from newly discovered evi-
dence, holding new evidence "to include any evidence not presented to the trial
court which is not merely cumulative in relation to evidence which was
presented at trial. '210 Defendant Branch lost his habeas corpus petition be-
cause of his own admissions of guilt and because the proffered testimony from
fellow inmates was apparently perjured."
The defendant should not be required to construct an entire defense with
evidence from outside the record. New facts may overlap with the evidence at
trial, shed new light on that evidence, or substantially impeach a-vital state's
witness. If so, the evidence should be heard. The scope of postconviction reme-
dies does not limit the facts to proof of innocence, as in Branch. PCRs may be
used to show other constitutional violations such as discrimination in grand or
petit jury selection, denial of counsel at some critical stage of pretrial proceed-
ings, or mitigation of a sentence of death.
The main problem is how to deal with cumulative evidence. New evidence
may be so much more substantial in quantity that it raises a reasonable
probability of a different result. Evidence is not merely cumulative as long as
it is different in kind from other evidence. A disinterested witness is usually
(West Supp. 1990); Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-39-3(2) (Supp. 1990); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1419
(1991); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 34.810.1(b), 177.375.2 (1989); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.850.
204. See infra Part VIII; see also Friendly, supra note 3, at 159 n.87 (discussing ABA Post-
conviction Standards); Mitchell, supra note 87, at 457-58 (quoting ABA Post-conviction Stan-
dards, in 4 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, cmt. at 22:18 (2d
ed. 1980)).
205. UNIF. POST-CONVICTION PROCEDURE ACT § 1(a)(5), 11 U.L.A. 248 (1991); WILKES,
supra note 12, at app. B.
206. See Decker, supra note 113, at 235-36, 248-49 (discussing coram nobis as a PCR);
Yackle, supra note 29, at 365-66.
207. In re Hall, 637 P.2d 690, 695 (Cal. 1981); 23A C.J.S. Criminal Law §§ 1448, 1449
(1989). But see State v. Fontaine, 559 A.2d 622 (R.I. 1989) (perverting the Uniform Act by
assimilating it to the old newly discovered evidence rule).
208. 449 P.2d 174 (Cal. 1969).
209. Id. at 183-84.
210. Id. at 184.
211. Id. at 186.
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more believable than the defendant 212 or a close friend or relative.2 13 Docu-
mentary evidence in support of an alibi may be more convincing than the oral
testimony of a number of witnesses.2 14 There is no neat and handy way to deal
with the various shapes new evidence may take.
There will be claims defaulted on direct appeal, as before. If the state wants
to take the first shot at making these defaults stick by creating a factual rec-
ord that will stand up in federal court, it can be done under this scheme. The
new evidence would concern ineffective assistance or whatever "objective fac-
tor external to the defense" is put forward to excuse the forfeiture. 15
If the "constitutional rights" formula is to be dispensed with in favor of a
"new evidence" formula, as I suggest, then the defendant proceeding to fed-
eral court will generally have to show state action 16 or ineffective assistance of
counsel, which will be imputed to the state. 217 The idea that the conviction
itself is state action 218 has not taken hold, and the Supreme Court usually
requires a ruling by the judge upon objection 1 9 or misconduct by the prosecu-
tion, police, or other state actor 20 as a prerequisite to due process jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court seems willing to entertain claims of actual
innocence without regard to state action, perhaps on an implicit theory that
due process demands a remedy for such unjust incarceration, and lays less
emphasis on the culpability of the prosecution when exculpatory evidence has
been suppressed. 2 1
I am not greatly concerned that a state PCR have exactly the scope of fed-
eral habeas. New evidence certainly seems to include all constitutional issues.
To ensure that state action is proved, however, the new formula can still coex-
ist with the old one of constitutional rights.
VIII. PROPOSALS
If I have read the cases correctly, then the narrower wording I am about to
propose gives the state, when combined with direct appeal, all the coverage it
212. See State v. Hayes, 785 S.W.2d 661, 663 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
213. See Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1986) (reversing death sentence when
sentencing court excluded testimony from disinterested parties as cumulative of defendant's and
defendant's wife's testimony).
214. State v. Harris, 64 S.W.2d 256, 258 (Mo. 1933).
215. McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 1470 (1991); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488
(1986).
216. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986) (holding that state action is required
before the Due Process Clause can be invoked).
217. See Murray, 477 U.S. at 488 ("[1]f the procedural default is the result of ineffective
assistance of counsel, the Sixth Amendment itself requires that responsibility for the default be
imputed to the State, which may not 'conduc[t] trials at which persons who face incarceration
must defend themselves without adequate legal assistance.'" (citations omitted)).
218. See Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 347 (1915) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
219. See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 512-13 (1976).
220. See Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219-20 (1982); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103,
112-13 (1935).
221. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985); Smith, 455 U.S. at 219-20.
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may desire as a forum for the exhaustion of remedies. There are several possi-
ble ways to do this, leaving challenges to the voluntariness of guilty pleas aside
for simplicity's sake. The idea that PCRs should be restricted to those rights
that tend, more or less strongly, to vindicate the innocent 22 has been rejected
as too narrow, not to say unworkable. It would be a different matter, of course,
if Congress adopted this view.228 Here goes:
A person convicted under the laws of this state may seek relief in the
sentencing court on the grounds that there is evidence not apparent from the
trial record that:
(a) creates a reasonable probability that had it been heard at trial the
defendant would have been acquitted, or been convicted of a lesser offense,
or would not have received the death sentence; or
(b) establishes a violation of a constitutional right that is presumptively
prejudicial.
This proposal excludes direct appeal issues by its terms. Subparagraph (a)
adopts the Strickland test for the prejudicial effect of evidence on issues of
"trial error" while (b) covers those "structural defects in the constitution of
the trial mechanism" that make the trial fundamentally unfair and are not
susceptible of harmless error analysis.2"4
Lesser included offenses will arise mainly in homicide cases.22 5 The death
penalty must be provided for because of the complex and specialized nature of
penalty phase litigation.2 6 The capital sentencing proceeding is virtually a
trial in itself.2
An alternate proposal:
A person convicted under the laws of this state may seek relief in the
sentencing court on the grounds that there is evidence not previously
presented or heard that shows a violation of a constitutional right such that
the trial or other proceeding in question was fundamentally unfair.
This proposal takes Strickland at its word when that case says that "funda-
mental fairness is the central concern of the writ of habeas corpus," '228 and
222. See, e.g., James B. Haddad, The Finality Distinction in Supreme Court Retroactivity
Analysis: An Inadequate Surrogate for Modification of the Scope of Federal Habeas Corpus, 79
Nw. U. L. REV. 1062, 1076 (1984).
223. See Note, supra note 17 at 404-05 (pointing out that constitutional doubts about the feasi-
bility of this approach are waning).
224. Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1265 (1991) (holding that use of coerced confes-
sions at trial was harmless error). Presumably, certain constitutional issues not mentioned in
Fulminante would also fit into the category of presumptive prejudice, such as double jeopardy, ex
post facto laws, and the trial of a mentally incompetent individual.
225. See, e.g., Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1 (1984); Jeffries & Stuntz, supra note 83, at 691
(arguing to limit habeas relief to cases of unjust conviction or a sentence of death).
• 226. See Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Jeffries &
Stuntz, supra note 83, at 719-21.
227. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686-87 (1984); Bullington v. Missouri, 451
U.S. 430, 438 (1981).
228. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.
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assumes that the remedy will cover all constitutional issues. The phrase "or
other proceeding" is meant to encompass procedures apart from the trial that
may come under scrutiny, such as those in the grand jury.
The distinction between evidence presented and heard can be significant.
Evidence might have been presented at trial in the form of an offer of proof,
but not heard or considered by the trier of fact, in which case the issue is one
for direct appeal, not a PCR.
The next version throws in a few more variables and requires the defendant
to raise constitutional issues in all cases:
A person [convicted [of a felony]] [in custody] under the laws of this
state may seek relief in the sentencing court on the grounds that there is
evidence not [apparent from the trial record] [previously presented or
heard] that establishes a violation of the person's constitutional rights that:
(a) creates a reasonable probability that had it been heard the defendant
would have been acquitted, or convicted of a lesser offense, or would not
have been sentenced to death; or
(b) is presumptively prejudicial.
Whether the test for prejudice is a reasonable probability of a different out-
come or fundamental unfairness, the court will perform what is in essence a
harmless error analysis. Accepting the alleged facts as true, it will weigh them
together with the evidence at trial favorable to the defense and against the
relative strength of the state's case. Cumulative evidence is inherently part of
this analysis. Nevertheless, if only to make it clear that similar evidence at
trial does not necessarily defeat a claim, the problem could be dealt with ex-
pressly. The language would read:
The evidence alleged to be true must be substantial and not merely cumu-
lative to evidence of [equal or] greater reliability, in quantity or in kind,
that was presented or heard at trial.
or:
If the court finds [by a preponderance of the evidence] [beyond a reasona-
ble doubt] that the evidence alleged is cumulative [in quantity or in kind] to
evidence [on the same issue] that was presented or heard at trial, and that
taken together with the latter it would not have had the effect contended
for, then it shall dismiss the [motion] [petition].
CONCLUSION
The proposals just given are not meant to exclude other possible grounds for
relief, such as lack of jurisdiction or excessive sentence, but only to rectify the
problem of constitutional rights. It is also beyond the scope of this Article to
deal with procedural matters that are capable of many different solutions, such
as statutes of limitations, provisions for counsel and for successive motions,
and processes for screening out frivolous petitions.
The system of postconviction remedies, both state and federal, is sick. I may
19921
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not be the best doctor, but I wanted to write a prescription instead of just
another diagnosis. I will be grateful to anyone who can improve upon what I
have done.
